## Sunday, August 7, 2011

### Trying to formalize the OTF

Via Victor Reppert, I came across another atheistic critique of the OTF by Thrasymachus. Inspired by its superior clarity, I have decided to further clarify my previous objections. Thrasymachus is also replying to a previous reply by Loftus which is better suited to my purposes than his other writings.

Thrasymachus focuses on the OTF as premised by Loftus in this post:

1. Rational people in distinct geographical locations around the globe overwhelmingly adopt and defend a wide diversity of religious faiths due to their upbringing and cultural heritage. This is the religious diversity thesis.

2. Consequently, it seems very likely that adopting one’s religious faith is not merely a matter of independent rational judgment but is causally dependent on cultural conditions to an overwhelming degree. This is the religious dependency thesis.

3. Hence the odds are highly likely that any given adopted religious faith is false.

4. So the best way to test one’s adopted religious faith is from the perspective of an outsider with the same level of skepticism used to evaluate other religious faiths. This ex-presses the OTF.

Loftus uses the phrase "the odds are highly likely" in response to the observation that a deductive equivalent of the above is invalid. But as Thrasymachus points out, it still is not clear that (3) follows from (1)/(2).

First, let me clear some fumes: I am assuming that everyone involved agrees that certainty in religious beliefs is unwarranted. I am also assuming that after this is recognized, the religious beliefs in question can be probabilized. This is not always obvious: some claims are not obviously susceptible to forceful probabilities. The doctrine of the Trinity, for example, has other conceptual issues to clear up before this may be done. Instead of throwing up our hands, we can focus on the subset of putative truths essential to Christianity (C) which can be probabilized, e.g. the Resurrection. It is the probability of these claims in conjunction that is represented by prob(C).

Second, (1) assumes that differing religious people are or can be rational, at least in the sense that their beliefs are internally consistent. Else, we have no need of the OTF, as incoherency arguments would more than suffice.

Now we can see what would be required for (3) to follow from (1) and (2). I will set as a threshold that (3)/(4) translate as requiring, at a minimum, that Christianity is not more likely to be true than not, i.e. 0.5>p(C). Denote the religious diversity thesis by Div, the religious dependency thesis by Dep, and p the prior probability of some unspecified Christian.1 The odds form of Bayes' Theorem is as follows:

$\frac{posterior(C)}{posterior(\sim C)}=\frac{p(Div\ \&\ Dep|C)}{p(Div\ \&\ Dep|\sim C)}\times\frac{p(C)}{p(\sim C)}$.

To get (3)/(4) as I interpret them, we need

$\frac{1}{2}>\frac{p(Div\ \&\ Dep|C)}{p(Div\ \&\ Dep|\sim C)}\times\frac{p(C)}{p(\sim C)}$.

In order for this to be the case, we need to know three different quantities. p(C)=1-p(~C), p(Div & Dep|C), and p(Div & Dep|~C). All we can say about p(C) is that it is greater than 1/2, as we are talking about a believer's prior. So we need something at least as strong as p(Div & Dep|~C)>p(Div & Dep|C). But as I pointed out in a previous post, not even this inequality must hold.

One can argue against such a person, but the appearance of his beliefs to a skeptic should not itself constitute an argument.

The case is different whenever we look at more common evangelical versions of Christianity, in which it is asserted that God intervenes or has intervened to aid Christianity and that the Holy Spirit works on the consciences of most or all to guide them to Truth. Free will. All that jazz. If a supernatural agency is at work in the Christian sociology of Christianity, then it is surprisingly hidden in the actual sociological details concerning Christianity. Here, the fact that Christian belief is largely a function of geography and parenting is very surprising. To a person who thinks that Christianity is a natural phenomenon, it should not be. I think that this is a very powerful argument against evangelical Christianity.

Notice then that there are at least two possible outcomes of "Christianity is like other religions to an outsider": it is irrelevant to some Christians, and it constitutes a challenging argument to others. So what we can not do is treat the motivations for the OTF as legitimizing it against religions generally, since the observations motivating the OTF are in no way an argument against certain religions. To pretend otherwise is to do nothing more than pomo an important, but narrow, point.
But it gets worse: even in the cases where the requisite inequality does hold, it may not be large enough to require our believer to make further arguments so as to defend his faith. This is because we still need to know what values of p(C) are warranted. Sure, it's less than 1, but is it less than 0.999 or 0.8?

And so we come to the reason why I did not attempt to formalize the OTF much earlier: it simply isn't a probabilistic inference; it is a demand about priors. I think this is why Loftus has yet to put an argument about probabilities in terms of formal probabilities, as far as I can find. This is not a case of updating a prior set of rational beliefs to a new probability by reasoned argument. Instead, it is an attempt to force a reworking of priors based on evidence.2 Again, I do not see why Christians need to accept this; intellectual consistency only requires that they account for Div and Dep by calculating their effects on their beliefs through conditioning.

Here we depart from the most accepted form of Bayesianism, i.e. subjective Bayesianism, entirely. We are encountering a curious version of objective Bayesianism. Normal' objective Bayesians calculate informationless' priors by equivocating across possibilities. What Loftus appears to want, as I noted in my previous posts, is that we gauge p(C) in something like the following way:

a. p(C)=1/N where N is the number of possible, mutually contradictory religions.
b. p(C)=1/N where N is the number of mutually contradictory religions in human history.
c. p(C)=1/N where N is the number of existing, mutually contradictory religions.
[Each of the above has an analogue where religions' is replaced by Christian sects'.]
d. p(C)=x where x is the frequency of the occurrence of Christians with respect to the general population. (Of the country, or world, or something.)
e. p(C)=A/B where B is the number of rational people and A is the number of rational people who are Christians.

And so on. Before moving on, the first response our Christian might deploy to any combination of the above is a simple one: No.

He is presumed to be rational and he can account for (1)/(2) in the usual way. Sorry to wax tautological, but he simply cannot be convicted of irrationality or unreasonableness whenever he is being both rational and reasonable, as judged by standard philosophical criteria. To go further with this, Loftus will have to mount a convincing attack on Bayesianism itself.

And of course we run into the earlier problem yet again; the argument Loftus presents cannot be probabilized. None of the above statements follows, or can follow, deductively or probabilistically, from (1)/(2).

I could continue on about the other problems, especially as they pertain to Loftus' desire to demand priors about religion but not about secular claims, or that this approach would most likely result in a weaker case against Christianity than the traditional arguments, but I've said this already, and Thrasymachus has done a better job explicating it. I could repeat why skepticism' is not a sort of default, and that positive claims will be necessary to argue against Christianity. (Otherwise, it's the fallacy of probabilistic Modus Tollens all the way down.) Or, I could reiterate some of Reppert's objections; for example, (1) and (2) are not so undeniably true as Loftus suggests, and Christians may account for differing religions using faith-based claims. The Pharaoh's magicians did not perform wonders so great as Aaron's, but they still made a snake out of a staff. Also, demons and sinful nature.

I pause. Is the argument really this straightforwardly awful? How does Loftus defend it?
One...option for the Christian might be to argue that I have not shown there is a direct causal relationship between RDPT (i.e. the Religious Dependency Thesis) (or 1) and the RDVT (i.e., the Religious Diversity Thesis) (or 2). Just because there is religious diversity doesn’t mean that religious views are overwhelmingly dependent on social and geographical factors, they might argue. Reminiscent of David Hume, who argued that we do not see cause and effect, they might try to argue I have not shown it exists between the RDPT and the RDVT. After all, if Hume can say he never sees one billiard ball “causing” another one to move just because they do so after making contact, then maybe there is no direct causal relationship between the RDPT and the RDVT. Is it possible, they might ask, that just because people have different religious faiths which are separated into distinct geographical locations on our planet, that “when and where” people are born has little to do with what they believe? My answer is that if this is possible, it is an exceedingly small possibility. Do Christians really want to hang their faith on such a slender reed as this? I’ve shown from sociological, geographical and psychological studies that what we believe is strongly influenced by “the accidents of history.” That’s all anyone can ask me to show.
Actually, we can ask for a valid argument. This is simply a genetic fallacy. The deductive genetic fallacy remains a fallacy, even if you argue for odds instead of certainties.

What else can I say? Nothing about this argument works, nor could it conceivably be reworked to capture what Loftus wants. There's a reason for this: it isn't actually an argument. It is a symptom of Loftus' assumption that he objectively and most accurately views the world in a culture-transcendent way.

I might have spoken too soon: if a Christian happens to trust Loftus more than God, there may be an opening for the OTF.

One last quibble to anticipate an objection: Loftus may claim that he is not addressing Calvinists, only evangelical Christians. That doesn't change the fact that his argument is not even an argument of that form. For this discrepancy to matter, he must restate his argument so as to account for variations in prior probability and variations in the Bayes factor specific to the religion in which he is interested. That is, he must pursue normal argumentation.

If he does so, I'll be more than happy.

1. It has to be this way, as we are interested in whether or not warrant for religion can be retained, not just how a skeptic feels about religion.

2. This is much weirder than anything attempted by normal objective Bayesians. I do not know of any accepted precedent for an approach like this.

Edit 8/8/11: I've been having a blast with acronyms lately. Please plagiarize the hell out of this excerpt from a comment at Reppert's place:
I should mention that I've seen John's post that he's on a blogging break, so I do not expect any response soon.

To be honest, I don't expect a serious response. Here's what he said to Thrasymachus' post back in January:

"I see nothing here I need to respond to."

Oh, my argument is invalid, cannot be reworked to convincingly get what I want out of it, and my approach in general is a failure. Where's the problem?

Staggering. And this is followed by another unhesitant shift:

"You can insert the word “skeptical” for “outsider” if you wish. And being skeptical means doubting or rejecting anything that the sciences say otherwise."

So I'll have fun at his expense until he or others get back to me with a real argument. A satisfactory response will do the following things:

1. Restatement: the precise structure and intended conclusion(s) of the OTF must be clearly stated, along with any contested background assumptions.

2. Support: The structure and conclusions of the argument must be corroborated. Is it deductive? If so, state exactly where and why. Is it a probabilistic argument? Then capture the argument using the formal tools of probabilism and defend it. Is it an argument about prior distributions? Then state clearly why it is that a coherent agent must adopt, prior to evidence, a specific distribution based on an observation which can already accounted for by a religious person or may be calibrated in a traditional, probabilistic manner (conditionalization).

3. Comprehensiveness: Clearly state outstanding objections and why they fail or are otherwise innocuous.

I call it the Simple Test For Understanding, or STFU, because proponents of the OTF should STFU already or move on.

1. I appreciate all this effort, and I think it has been pretty clear for a long time that there are serious problems with the "test" as you've stated it.

Instead of concluding religion X is likely false, the conclusion should be an injunction to critically investigate the religious beliefs of your upbringing. After all, you might have been pulled into something silly that, when your full rational faculties bear down on it, you discover you don't believe.

Lots of caveats and qualifications would need to be added to make it valid, but that should be pretty easy.

I think this would be the most charitable way to reconstruct the OTF. It doesn't assume there is a correct "answer" to the test (which is why many of us have been saying that the OTF is not a test with an answer, but a tool to induce people to think critically).

Obviously it is not new to recognize the cultural dependence of religion, and to use this to push skeptical thinking. Slapping a new name on the argument doesn't change that. This is basically what Western philosophy has been doing since it was born. Perhaps it speaks to the weak education of evangelicals (and recently ex-evangelicals) that this would seem a new or cutting edge idea. Anyone that has taken a good intro to philosophy course knows better.

2. "Instead of concluding religion X is likely false, the conclusion should be an injunction to critically investigate the religious beliefs of your upbringing. After all, you might have been pulled into something silly that, when your full rational faculties bear down on it, you discover you don't believe."

That would be a fine conclusion to the observation. I just think that this spirit is already captured by the "when you understand why I reject your gods..." quote, amongst other things. There are many good ways to invite religious people to freethought; the OTF as frequently employed is a bad one. The very name causes trouble.

3. And thanks for your appreciation. I appreciate it :D

4. First off, I enjoyed the explanation of "equivocating across possibilities." Thanks for that.

I do have a question. You wrote: " And so on. Before moving on, the first response our Christian might deploy to any combination of the above is a simple one: No."

I am still not clear why the Christian could reasonably deny all of the options you listed. Is it your position that the options you listed are all unreasonable, or that there is a better alternative, or simply that since there is no way to agree on priors there is no way to proceed?

I believe I understand that one could take a Calvinist position in response to an OTF query, but this seems like a kind of fideism to me. And I think that's part of what the OTF is designed to do -- point out that while a religious conviction may be correct, there doesn't seem to be a rational way to justify the conviction.

5. "I am still not clear why the Christian could reasonably deny all of the options you listed. Is it your position that the options you listed are all unreasonable, or that there is a better alternative, or simply that since there is no way to agree on priors there is no way to proceed?"

There are ways to agree on priors, but no accepted manner applies to this case. Note that a crucial fact here is the assumption that the involved religious person can be rational. What this means is that he already has minimal consistency (logical) and probabilistic consistency (coherency), e.g. if he ascribes p(X), he ascribes p(~X)=1-p(X).

So the crucial fact is reasonableness. The main way that we account for reasonableness is by employing Bayes rule to update probabilities in light of new information. This process involves a number, called the Bayes factor', which is the value by which your old odds are multiplied to get your new odds. The process of calculating this number is called calibration', and it can be simple and empirical (using e.g. frequency data), or it can capture the broader notions of prediction or explanation. Roughly, the deviation of the Bayes factor from 1 correlates with the degree to which an observation is expected on the assumption of a theory, assuming that the alternative predicts that observation.

So if the demographic data is at all problematic for a Christian, he can account for the change in his confidence based on the contrast in the expectations of his view and e.g. a naturalistic view.

This form is nice, as it confirms a lot of intuitions. We do not consider every surprise' to be evidence against our outlook, for example. For that to be the case, there has to be good reason for thinking that we should not have been surprised, especially in the form of an alternative, plausible outlook which explains the observation.

Bayes rule can be used to capture an enormous amount of probabilistic reasoning. If you're unfamiliar, I have my (more confusing) primer, and then there's this, which I cite in the same.

"I believe I understand that one could take a Calvinist position in response to an OTF query, but this seems like a kind of fideism to me."

Right, and from there, we would argue (in the usual way) against the plausibility of doctrines essential to Calvinism. A probabilistic argument using Div and Dep may not settle the case against a particular brand of Christianity, but it may force believers to put confidence in other doctrines which themselves will require defense, or may undermine doctrines they find essential. So if an evangelical circumvents Div and Dep by putting confidence in Predestination, then he must - to be rational - lose confidence in free will.

I'm a subjective Bayesian, but I'm not endorsing an unprincipled relativism. Rationality and the mere accounting for information is hard freakin' work, much less ensuring that it is all properly calibrated. Bayesianism allows us to turn to believers and list ranges of credence in a variety of positions that they must have in order to be rational, and I doubt they will usually like the results.

But it takes a lot of work to flesh this out. The last thing we should do is avoid this work by making unconvincing demands about having to adopt our positions in the first place.

6. (And I note that Calvinists do not tend to be evidential apologists, so we may have to discuss the question in an entirely different manner.)

7. (And to avoid plagiarizing, the comment about not endorsing an unprincipled relativism is due to Tim McGrew. If I recall correctly, it appeared at the bottom of his argument on miracles at the Stanford Encyclopedia, which has since been revised.)

8. JP, thanks for the response.

I read your first 5 paragraphs explaining Bayes calculations (and I am familiar with Bayes theorem, but only in a very dilettantish fashion -- I've read some other primers, built my own spreadsheets, and done some problems to get used to handling a variety of probability problems using the good Reverend's formula). What I am still struggling to understand is why “[t]here are ways to agree on priors, but no accepted manner applies to this case.”

You explain that “...if the demographic data is at all problematic for a Christian, he can account for the change in his confidence based on the contrast in the expectations of his view and e.g. a naturalistic view.” I just don’t understand this, nor how it applies to my question.

JP: “Right, and from [a Calvinist position], we would argue (in the usual way) against the plausibility of doctrines essential to Calvinism.”

Well, my point is that it appears that you are defending the reasonableness of a Calvinist who “knows” that he is saved, precisely because his faith says that he is among the few. I find it hard to call a tautological position reasonable.

JP: “I'm a subjective Bayesian, but I'm not endorsing an unprincipled relativism. Rationality and the mere accounting for information is hard freakin' work, much less ensuring that it is all properly calibrated. Bayesianism allows us to turn to believers and list ranges of credence in a variety of positions that they must have in order to be rational, and I doubt they will usually like the results.”

It sounds to me like I agree with all of this. It also sounds like it could be a description of the OTF (as I think I understand it).

So, and I’m honestly not trying to be daft here, I am just having trouble coming around to understanding what your criticism is, and why a religious believer can safely ignore the challenges posed by the OTF and still call themselves rational.

9. My thanks for your reply. And no worries, I don't think you're being daft at all.

"I just don’t understand this, nor how it applies to my question."

I was basically pointing to the odds form of Bayes rule as an alternative approach. I should have been clearer in saying that this doesn't mean that nobody should adopt such odds, only that the OTF, which is an epistemically aggressive statement, does not successfully establish that somebody should.

"Well, my point is that it appears that you are defending the reasonableness of a Calvinist who “knows” that he is saved, precisely because his faith says that he is among the few. I find it hard to call a tautological position reasonable."

If a rational person has a belief, and encounters a fact which does not affect the probability of that belief, that person is being reasonable with respect to that fact.

I'm not claiming that Calvinism is reasonable here, just that an OTF-like attempt to demonstrate the unreasonability of Calvinism does not work.

On methods to assess priors: as I mentioned before, a commonly employed method is equivocation, but equivocation is what one does on the assumption that no relevant information is available.

Now, how should we assess prior odds for Christianity? I think we have to spell out what Christianity means in order to do so. I have some ideas. To repeat a comment from over at the dangerous idea thread:

""
An example:

1. Christianity is true only if the Resurrection occurred.
2. The prior probability of the Resurrection is calibrated with respect to our confidence in the tendency of dead people to remain dead.
3. The textual evidence for the Resurrection is not sufficiently strong to overcome the prior yielded in (2).
4. Therefore, Christianity is probably not true.

I'm working on such a method to craft a somewhat general, Humean argument against miracles, but it relies on certain qualifiers and conditions which may be reasonable to reject. Someone may claim that (2) fails to hold if they have an adequate natural theology, independently defended, which changes the odds on the Resurrection before analyzing its evidence. But I see several plausible ways to privilege' (2). And (3), if adequately defended, shows how this approach can easily favor skeptics.

But strictly speaking, (2) is not objective'. If anything, Christians will be bringing a belief in Christianity to the table when analyzing the textual evidence. And as I mentioned, it is possible that they could legitimize that.
""

But there are other ways that Christians attempt to ground their beliefs, and those too may have to be addressed. They are Legion.

Moving on:

"..why a religious believer can safely ignore the challenges posed by the OTF and still call themselves rational."

Well, if we're using rational' in the term of art sense that I use it, this is presumed by the OTF. As I said in the post, we are otherwise presupposing an incoherency argument. How believers can ensure that they are preserving rationality is by sticking with conditionalization. (The new probability is a conditional probability, which itself satisfies the original axioms.) If you mean rational' in the broader sense of reasonable', the issue is one of calibrating the Bayes factor.

Am I missing anything important?

10. JP: " If a rational person has a belief, and encounters a fact which does not affect the probability of that belief, that person is being reasonable with respect to that fact."

Well, there is being reasonable with respect to one's belief, and there is having a reasonable belief. If the above is your standard, isn’t my belief that I'm a brain in a vat reasonable? It just seems to me that in order to seek shelter from the OTF one needs to adopt an empistemically-sealed environment, and that hardly seems like a reasonable position.

JP: "I'm not claiming that Calvinism is reasonable here, just that an OTF-like attempt to demonstrate the unreasonability of Calvinism does not work."

Right, I think we are in agreement here.

JP: "Now, how should we assess prior odds for Christianity?"

Yeah, that is the live question. I am interested to see what you come up with.

I see now that I should catch up to this conversation by reading your August 5 post. Let me do that first and resume there or here.

11. Before saying too much, I'll wait on you as requested.

"Right, I think we are in agreement here."

Which as I explained in the post means that the OTF is neither deductive nor probabilistic. Properly speaking, it isn't even empirical, except in the trivial sense that Div and Dep happen to be empirical.

Anyways, the approach I gave as an alternative example has its limitations. I stipulate (1), but many Christians might disagree, though there may be arguments internal to Christianity for its truth (e.g. those of C.S. Lewis and other conservative apologists.) It's also incomplete. If the evidence for the Resurrection leaves it at probability 1/1000, there may be other arguments for Christianity using Bayes theorem, just as there will be arguments against it. So in order to ensure (4), we have to modify (3) as follows:

(3)': the cumulative evidence for Christianity does not overcome its prior improbability as yielded by (2).

12. I'm still absorbing some of these posts. A principal point of confusion for me is your saying, " the argument Loftus presents cannot be probabilized." I think you also say that the argument is only trivially empirical (Div and Dep). I guess that I'm not understanding how it is that the numbers proposed in the OTF cannot be probablized (and I assume that this means that I don't understand the definition for 'probabalized).

13. Interesting how your last comment to me, and mine just now, arrive in my e-mail box as double posts. I will respond again if this comment double posts in my e-mail box -- maybe you can fix that with a setting?

14. Nevermind. Just realized I had a problem with my online accounts. Ignore the double posting (non)issue.

15. "I'm still absorbing some of these posts. A principal point of confusion for me is your saying, " the argument Loftus presents cannot be probabilized." I think you also say that the argument is only trivially empirical (Div and Dep). I guess that I'm not understanding how it is that the numbers proposed in the OTF cannot be probablized (and I assume that this means that I don't understand the definition for 'probabalized)."

What I have done in this post is to categorize what the OTF could be into three forms: a deductive argument, a probabilistic argument, or a (strange form of) objective Bayesian demands about prior distributions.

If it was merely the third form, then the inapplicability of the OTF to Calvinism makes no sense. But the probabilistic version - where the inapplicability of the OTF to Calvinism does make sense - does not translate into a valid argument about the probability of (some forms of) Christianity. There are two crucial terms to be discussed, i.e. the prior odds and the Bayes factor, which are required to yield that conclusion.

Loftus assumes at the outset that the prior odds are low, which begs the question that Christian belief is unwarranted, and that a secular alternative must have the lion's share of probability when entering into other arguments.

So when I say trivially empirical', I mean that the first two premises of the OTF are empirical, but the inference to any particular improbability is not empirical.

16. "First, let me clear some fumes: I am assuming that everyone involved agrees that certainty in religious beliefs is unwarranted."

Why would you, or anyone, assume this? Is this not begging the question against "religion"? Does not this assumption undercut your pose as being an open-minded searcher for the truth?

If one is not certain that the beliefs one chooses to hold and promote are true, then does that not make one, at best, a liar, and quite possibly intellectually dishonest (which is worse than mere lying)?

17. "If one is not certain that the beliefs one chooses to hold and promote are true, then does that not make one, at best, a liar, and quite possibly intellectually dishonest (which is worse than mere lying)?"

I'm not certain about gravity. I am extremely confident about gravity. I assign it a very high probability. Am I lying to say that gravity exists, and that it is inadvisable to waltz off a skyscraper?

You'll note that I didn't beg the question against religious belief, even quite strong religious belief. If absolute certainty is to be contended with, we must look somewhere other than probabilistic argument. But no, I do not take assertions of absolute certainty to be reasonable.

Would you care to try?

18. "... But no, I do not take assertions of absolute certainty to be reasonable.

Would you care to try?
"

Example 1: I am absolutely certain that 1+1=2 in all times and all places; further, I assert as an absolute certaintly that any man who denies this is either stupid or a fool (that is, intellectually dishonest), with whom conversation on any subject is logically impossible.

Example 2: I am absolutely certain that the law of non-contradiction is true, valid, and applicable in all times and all places; further, I assert as an absolute certaintly that any man who denies this is either stupid or a fool (that is, intellectually dishonest), with whom conversation on any subject is logically impossible.

Example 3: I am absolutely certain that what is true is true and what is false is false, and that the one never "becomes" the other, and that the assertion of this certainty is true, valid, and applicable in all times and all places; further, I assert as an absolute certaintly that any man who denies this is either stupid or a fool (that is, intellectually dishonest), with whom conversation on any subject is logically impossible.

See? It's not so difficult.

19. "See? It's not so difficult."

You might have noticed that tautologies receive probability 1 in Bayesianism. If I wanted to be pesky, I could reduce each of your three examples to problems of semantic model-dependency and translation from (possibly unreal) abstraction to something of ontological status - introducing potential errors in the process - but I'll leave that aside.

The question I asked was concerning religion. Do you think that absolute certainty is ever warranted concerning possibly false propositions as entertained by fallible reasoners?

20. Okay, I think I'm catching up a little bit here at your and Thrasymachus's objections (I just now skimmed through his entry for the first time).

One that that it seems that neither of your comments address (and excuse me if they do but I haven't read them yet, or maybe I just missed them) is that the OTF serves to highlight the fact that there are no objective measures with which to compare the credibility of religious beliefs.

Thrasymachus brings up that evolution could, by the OTF, be seen as highly unlikely. But this seems to ignore the fact that there are excellent objective criteria available with which to resolve disagreement about Evolution with other explanations for the diversity of life. There are not excellent objective criteria available with which to resolve disagreement about religious claims. I don’t think I agree that it is special pleading to point this out.

The non-existence of God is trickier, because the existence of a God is a moving target.

But I very comfortable with moral issues being dependent on time and place, as I am sympathetic to moral subjectivism. So I see no problem with special pleading there.

The OTF, it seems to me, seeks to highlight the fact that there are no objective criteria with which a faith-based (or poorly documented) claim can be meaningfully differentiated against another. And I imagine that raising awareness of this fact is what the OTF does most effectively. And if so, I think it does serve a useful purpose (while not functioning as advertised by some, I imagine), and is hardly a thing to be abandoned.

In other words, it seems to me that the OTF’s purpose is not to serve as an argument against all religious belief, but to ask the religious believer to find grounds for her belief. So, my question back to you (and Thrasymachus), is why can’t the OTF merely be a very good question with which to start? (or, Whence the anger over Loftus’s promotion of the OTF?)

21. I'll take your points out of order, if you'll forgive that.

"But I very comfortable with moral issues being dependent on time and place, as I am sympathetic to moral subjectivism. So I see no problem with special pleading there."

Agreed.

"In other words, it seems to me that the OTF’s purpose is not to serve as an argument against all religious belief, but to ask the religious believer to find grounds for her belief. So, my question back to you (and Thrasymachus), is why can’t the OTF merely be a very good question with which to start? (or, Whence the anger over Loftus’s promotion of the OTF?)"

Were that only it, I would not have a problem. As I explained in my earlier post, what I objected to is the gross over-inflation of a perfectly legitimate point. If Loftus can say something like "reasonable/intellectually consistent Christians should take the OTF, and if they fail it, they should not believe", he isn't exactly suggesting a starting point of discussion or empathy.

"The OTF, it seems to me, seeks to highlight the fact that there are no objective criteria with which a faith-based (or poorly documented) claim can be meaningfully differentiated against another. And I imagine that raising awareness of this fact is what the OTF does most effectively. And if so, I think it does serve a useful purpose (while not functioning as advertised by some, I imagine), and is hardly a thing to be abandoned."

As I've been discussing over here, another big problem with the posited Outsider position' is one of non-uniqueness. Christians - or at least those serious about rational warrant - tend to work scientific inquiry into their outlook. I'm not sure what tools we have that they lack which we can assert as being such, categorically, before entering the arguments.

22. JP, sorry, been very busy at work. I wanted to follow up on the discussion, so here are my (still too hastily prepared) thoughts.

JP: “As you've said, it could use some clean-up. Let me know if you have success and we'll discuss it. In particular, the standards you list need to be clearly translated in terms of epistemic merit/degree. Some historical accounts of miracles are more sound - or less obviously bunkum - than others.”

Yeah, not sure entirely we’re I was going with this, but let me try and push it forward. First, a quick clarification: By the epistemic merit/degree of historical standards, do you mean the extent to which historical accounts should be valued, or that the standards should help to meaningfully distinguish between competing historical claims? (I agree that both should be considered, but I want to make sure that you don’t mean something else.)

That question aside, the point I was trying to make is that the OTF raises the issue (however inelegantly promoted by some) that it seems impossible to meaningfully distinguish between all of the competing (and contradictory) religious claims when viewed by an outsider. This should give any religious believer pause, because if they cannot persuade an outsider that their religious claim can be meaningfully distinguished from other religious claims, I think this jeopardizes the reasonableness of that individual’s religious belief.

Notice that I am not saying that the religious believer need convince the outsider that her religious belief is true. What I am saying is that given the differences in competing claims among all religions, the outsider seems to be lacking a well-defined epistemic standard that he can apply to make a reasonable determination about which religious belief is most likely true. This, it seems to me, introduces the need for a universal set of standards that can be applied to religious claims. And this should be the goal of any religious believer who feels that that their religious belief warrants getting this answer right.

What I am suggesting is that to criticize the OTF, one should be able to offer a solution to the problems it highlights (described above). Because I think the OTF is not an argument, per se, but a criticism. So, if religious belief is to be considered more reasonable than, say solipsism, what are the (non-question begging) standards that we apply to distinguish the bogus religious claims from the true? This, it seems, should be the answer to the OTF.

23. "Notice that I am not saying that the religious believer need convince the outsider that her religious belief ..."

On top of all the other foolish and/or bad-reasoned things you go about saying, you also must use that false and disgusting "gender inclusive language"?

24. You're a very lonely person, aren't you, Ilion?

25. Do you spend a lot of time talking to squirrels?

26. I see, Mr Parrish, that my initial impression of you, fostered by Mr Reppert, was quite mistaken.

27. Ah, was it though?

When I was criticizing an atheist' argument, you were happy to laud my reasonableness. However, the very moment I said anything remotely critical about the relationship between science and religion - as exampled by Galileo - you decided to renounce your previous opinion. Despite your not having carefully read my position. Despite the concurrence of religious people with the reasonableness of my very qualified position.

So yes, I know you've changed your initial opinion already. Ever since I defended anything even remotely challenging to your position, your mind flipped like a soggy pancake.

As I said before, I'm happy to work without your approval. If you really think that my usage of female pronouns for non-descript, imaginary people is a crime against rationality, I am more than happy to work without your approval.

28. Tony,

First, I apologize for the delayed response.

"First, a quick clarification: By the epistemic merit/degree of historical standards, do you mean the extent to which historical accounts should be valued, or that the standards should help to meaningfully distinguish between competing historical claims? (I agree that both should be considered, but I want to make sure that you don’t mean something else.)"

It is a mixture of the two. I discuss part of the first argument in a reformulation of Hume's argument. I suspect, however, that overly general statements which limit the epistemic strength of historical findings, as represented by a Bayes factor, will fail. So, in my reworking, the first step of analyzing an argument for a miracle via historical documents is to investigate ineliminable sources of error and determining what constraints these impose on any argument proceeding from the relevant texts. If no convincing procedure of this type is found, one extracts more details concerning the texts, logging the cumulative potential of error as one proceeds. Now, concerning the latter statement, distinctions between competing explanations will have to be taken in the particulars of a particular analysis. So, for example, if one is discussing the textual evidence for the Resurrection, contrasting it with something else', one teases out the most important' hypotheses in the category something else'. From there, values are investigated. (An example of this procedure is found in the McGrews' paper on the Resurrection and my discussion of the same.)

We should not invest in overly general standards. I do not think it necessary to do so, and I do not think that such proposals will be overly convincing.

"That question aside, the point I was trying to make is that the OTF raises the issue (however inelegantly promoted by some) that it seems impossible to meaningfully distinguish between all of the competing (and contradictory) religious claims when viewed by an outsider."

There are two senses in which this statement can be read: the first is that many religions cannot all be epistemically accounted for due to their overwhelming number and possible number. This is a truism. The second sense is that the type' of evidence presented for a variety of competing religions is similar in some epistemically significant way. This too is correct; but as against proponents of the OTF, the effect of this similarity may be analyzed in terms of Bayes factors as opposed to demands about prior distributions.

"Notice that I am not saying that the religious believer need convince the outsider that her religious belief is true. What I am saying is that given the differences in competing claims among all religions, the outsider seems to be lacking a well-defined epistemic standard that he can apply to make a reasonable determination about which religious belief is most likely true. This, it seems to me, introduces the need for a universal set of standards that can be applied to religious claims. And this should be the goal of any religious believer who feels that that their religious belief warrants getting this answer right."

Before attempt to investigate a universal' set of standards for religious claims, we can instead apply the preexisting, general rules of inference available in Bayesian philosophy. Where valid, a universal standard should fall out' of this general theory. Since these methods are applied in the sciences and everyday life with such success, their extension to religious claims is of tremendous interest - to apologists and atheists alike.

29. [Continued]

"Because I think the OTF is not an argument, per se, but a criticism. So, if religious belief is to be considered more reasonable than, say solipsism, what are the (non-question begging) standards that we apply to distinguish the bogus religious claims from the true? This, it seems, should be the answer to the OTF."

The OTF is a strange criticism, as it lacks any conclusion. It might be used to invite critical reflection on belief, but again, the OTF adds nothing to the other methods of making the invitation.

I think that (roughly) the answer you are seeking is available. But it requires a lot of hard work, and the method is generally unavailable to popular audiences without a lot of individual exertion. But that is the price of air-tight argumentation; there are lots of holes to plug.